GJB 373B-2019 in English
VALIDFuze design, safety criteria
- Issued on:2019-12-08
- Implemented on:2020-01-01
- File Format:PDF
- Delivery:Via email within 5 business days
$418.00
Introduction
Background of Standard Revision and Technological Evolution
As the top-level standard for the safety design of military fuzes in my country, GJB373B-2019 inherits the technical accumulation of the first edition in 1987 and the revised edition in 1997, and mainly responds to the following technical development needs:
| Technical Dimension | GJB373A-1997 | GJB373B-2019 |
|---|---|---|
| Electromagnetic Protection | Test Method Not Clearly Defined | New GJB8678/GJB8708 Test Standards |
| Logical Control | No Special Provisions | Added Appendix A Safety Requirements for Logic Devices |
| Failure rate indicators | Ungraded regulations | Clearly define the failure rate thresholds at different stages |
Core safety design elements
4.2.2 Redundant insurance device design
The standard requires that the fuze must be equipped with at least two independent insurance devices. Typical implementation plans include:
- Mechanical rotor + environmental sensor dual insurance structure
- Dynamic energy switch and electromagnetic lock composite insurance
- Heterogeneous combination of centrifugal insurance and air pressure sensor
The verification of independence needs to be proved by fault tree analysis (FTA) that the probability of common cause failure is ≤1×10-6.
5.2.4 Non-isolated explosion sequence control
For fuzes using permitted explosives such as Poly-Ao-9, the following conditions must be met:
Case: An electronic safety system adopts three-level control:
1) Environmental identifier verifies that the launch acceleration>100g
2) Dynamic energy switch switches at a frequency of 1kHz
3) High-voltage converter is activated after a delay of 500ms
Key technical innovations
4.9 Logic device safety control
For programmable devices such as FPGA, the standard clearly states:
| Safety requirements | Implementation methods |
|---|---|
| Anti-reconstruction | Use OTP memory to solidify logic |
| Anti-interference | Power isolation + triple-mode redundant design |
| State verification | Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) mechanism |
Implementation suggestions and precautions
- Design verification:FMEA analysis is required to cover all credible failure modes
- Production control:An independent quality traceability system should be established for key parts
- Electromagnetic compatibility:RE102/CS115 test is carried out according to GJB151B-2013
- Software security:Follow the GJB2786 development process, and the code needs MC/DC test
5.6 Safety margin design of electric explosive device
Main points for verification of no-fire threshold (MNFS):
- Test sample size ≥ 50 rounds, confidence level 95%
- Margin factor ≥ 1.5 times the maximum interference level
- Need to simulate the worst case of power supply transient (PST)

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